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(1865); Hassell v. Hassell, et al., 129 Ala. 326, 29 So. 695 (1899);
White v. Stevenson, 144 Cal. 104, 77 Pac. 828 (904). Therefore,
unless the intention of the parties is otherwise, when a mortgage is
discharged and a new one taken as part of a single transaction, the
seizin between the release and the subsequent mortgage is but momen-
tary and right of dower cannot attach. Crisman v. Lanterman, 149
Cal. 647, 87 Pac. 89, 117 Am. St. 167 (i9o6); Westchester Fire
Ins. Co. v. Norfolk Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 14 Fed. (2) 524 (1926).
In the case at bar the prior mortgage was cancelled of record. Gener-
ally this is not conclusive of discharge. 44 Ohio App. 18o, 184 N.E.
765, 14 Abs. 65 (1932). Contra, where surrendered to the mortgagor.
J. R. Wilkes v. R. M. Miller, Admr., supra.
In accord with the great weight of authority the Supreme Court
was entirely justified in holding that the widow was dowable in the
surplus only. The question of whether the second mortgage was a sub-
stitute for the original could have easily been decided either way
because of the fact that the intention of the parties is such a controlling
factor. SAm TOPOLOSKY.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
COUNTY CHARTER VESTING MUNICIPAL POWER IN THE
COUNTY
The Constitutional amendment of November, 1933, Article X,
was intended to give counties a privilege of home rule similar to that
already enjoyed by municipalities. (See County Home Rule in Ohio,
by Harvey Walker, I Ohio St. L. J. II, 1935). It provides for the
election of a charter commission to prepare a charter for submission to
the electors of the county. The simplest form of charter which can be
adopted is one which does not vest any municipal power in the county.
Such a charter to become effective requires only a simple majority vote
of the electors voting thereon in the county. But a charter vesting any
municipal power in the county must also have the approval of the
majority of electors voting thereon in the largest municipality, in the
county outside of such municipality, and in each of a majority of the
combined total of municipalities and townships in the county.
The charter submitted to the electors of Cuyahoga County was
intended to be of the first class, and a majority of those voting thereon
in the county approved it. The members of the Board of Elections
refused to certify that the charter had been approved and had become
effective. A writ of mandamus was brought in the Supreme Court of
Ohio to compel them to so certify. The contention of the Board, and
the court upheld them in it, was that the charter vested municipal
power in the county and so required the special majorities to become
effective. State, ex rel. Howland v. Krause, 130 Ohio St. 455, Ohio
Bar, March 2, 1936, 2oo N.E. 512.
The court held that "in numerous instances" the charter sought to
vest municipal power in Cuyahoga County. The specific instances
cited were (i) the power to organize and maintain a police department
to enforce ordinances, (2) "power . . . . with reference to a civil
service commission," (3) the authority to enact ordinances, and (4) the
initiative and referendum powers.
With regard to the power to organize and maintain a police depart-
ment, the court states that it is generally recognized as a municipal
power; but the court, realizing, perhaps, that there is not a sufficient
distinction between a police department and a sheriff's office, goes on to
state that: "Nowhere has the Legislature conferred power upon a
sheriff to enforce ordinances of either a city or of a county council."
If this assertion were true, the power to enforce ordinances of a city or
village would be a municipal power. But Section 13432-I of the Gen-
eral Code reads as follows: "A sheriff, deputy sheriff . . . . shall
arrest and detain a person found violating a law of this state, or an
ordinance of a city or village, until a warrant can be obtained." The
opinion did not refer to this statute although it was cited in plaintiff's
brief.
Another statement of the court seems to be of doubtful validity:
"Furthermore, power is sought to be vested in the county council with
reference to a civil service commission. That is a power conferred upon
and long exercised by the cities of this state and has never been con-
ferred upon a county." It is rather surprising that the court made no
reference to the following statute, also cited in plaintiff's brief: Section
2394-4, General Code (i16 Ohio Laws 133): "The electors of any
county may establish by charter provision, a county civil service commis-
sion, personnel office, or personnel department."
A further discussion of the "power . . . .with reference to a civil
service commission" and of the two other provisions which, according
to the court, sought to vest municipal power in the county will be
deferred until after a consideration of the purpose and the effect of the
requirement as to special majorities. As to these points the opinion is
not at all clear. Perhaps the difficulty is due in large measure to the
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failure of the court to define the words "municipal power." A distinc-
tion should be drawn between power now vested solely in municipalities
and powers now vested in municipalities and counties alike. The latter
are most certainly not municipal powers within the meaning of the Con-
stitution, while the former may be. Such was the definition offered in
defendant's brief. Municipal powers are "such powers as are by law
and the Constitution vested in municipalities and are not vested in
counties." That the court did not have this distinction clearly in mind
seems likely from the following statement: "The specified majorities
are required if any municipal powers are conferred upon the county,
whether such powers are concurrent or exclusive." This sentence might
be understood to mean that "the specified majorities are required where
any of the powers conferred on the county have also been vested in
municipalities." Color is lent to this interpretation by the two following
sentences: "A division of the authority enjoyed by the municipalities is
to that extent a taking or transfer of their municipal power." "In
numerous instances the charter seeks to vest in Cuyahoga County powers
which are vested in municipalities by the Constitution or laws of the
state."
If the court did mean to say that powers now exercised by munici-
palities and counties alike are municipal powers, it needs but little dem-
onstration to prove its contention wrong. The Constitution provides
that "Every such charter . . . . shall provide for the exercise of all
powers vested in, and the performance of all duties imposed upon coun-
ties and county oficers by law." It may provide for the exercise of
municipal powers, but in such case it must receive the special majorities.
Section 3, Article X. If the charter must provide for the exercise of all
powers vested in county officers, as for instance the power to arrest for
violating municipal ordinances, and if this power is to be considered a
municipal power, then every charter must obtain the special majorities.
Such an interpretation would most certainly require a tortured construc-
tion of the Constitution.
As to the purpose of the requirement of special majorities the court
says: "[It] was intended to afford an opportunity to municipalities to
protect themselves and preserve their municipal integrity through the
ballot. It would deprive them of a part of the protection afforded by
the Constitution if they may be divested of a portion of their municipal
power, notwithstanding the adverse vote of a majority of the municipal-
ities of the county." If such was the purpose of the requirement, why
did the court concern itself with the charter provisions as to a civil
service commission and the initiative and referendum? The civil service
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commission was to operate only on county officers and not at all on
municipal officials. The charter provision for initiative and referendum
applied only to county ordinances. Must the municipalities be protected
from the exercise by the county of these powers? Do these powers
divest the municipalities of a "portion of their municipal power" even to
the extent of a "division of authority?" Perhaps the framers of the
Constitution had in mind a definition of municipal powers which was
somewhat narrower even than "such powers as are by law and the
Constitution vested in municipalities and are not vested in counties." It
may be contended that they meant substantive powers as distinguished
from adjective powers. Indeed it may be questioned whether the "power
with reference to a civil service commission" and the "initiative and
referendum powers" can be accurately termed powers. These provi-
sions "provide the form of government of the county," as the Constitu-
tion requires every charter to do, and do not enable the county to exert
any further authority over the land or inhabitants of the county. They
cannot come into conflict with any power exercised by a municipality.
The provision for a civil service commission merely provides a different,
and perhaps more satisfactory, mode of selecting county officers and
employees. The provision for initiative and referendum merely dis-
tributes the exercise of the ordinance making power between the council
and the electors of the county.
Is not the power to enact ordinances of the same nature? Stating it
without qualification, as the court did, as "the power to enact ordinan-
ces," we may visualize the county council as possessed of unlimited
legislative authority. But the charter provision reads: "To enact such
ordinances and make such reasonable rules and regulations as may be
necessary and proper to carry out the powers conferred on counties and
county, officers by this Charter and the Constitution and laws of the
State." This power is "simply an incidental power to adopt formal
regulations" and the ordinances adopted would differ little, if at all,
from the resolutions of the county commissioners. If an ordinance
passed by the county council were not "necessary and proper to carry
out the powers conferred," it would be void and of no effect. If such
an ordinance were passed and an attempt made to enforce it, an appeal
to the courts would determine its validity. Moreover, if, by ignoring the
"such ordinances . . . . as" limitation, the provision can be inter-
preted as granting unlimited legislative authority, nevertheless, it seems
that the court was at fault in not giving some weight to the general
limitation of the charter governing its construction. Article XX, Sec. 6:
"Nothing contained in this Charter shall be construed to vest in the
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County any municipal powers which would require its approval by the
special majorities set forth in Section 3, Article X, of the Constitution
of Ohio." Of this provision the court says: "The provisions throughout
the charter which confer municipal powers upon the county cannot be
so readily eliminated by an explanation of intent and purpose that they
are not to be included." Perhaps it is true that, if any powers essential
to the operation of the charter government were held to be municipal
powers, then the entire charter should be held invalid. And yet, has
not the attempted limitation at least this effect: that if a provision is
capable of two interpretations, the court shoild adopt the interpretation
most favorable to the validity of the charter?
Only the four provisions here discussed were held to vest municipal
powers in the county. A county charter government could function
without a civil service commission and without a provision for initiative
and referendum. The charter must, however, provide for the exercise
of the powers and duties imposed upon the sheriff by law, and the county
council must have some means of making rules and regulations. Perhaps
a charter which used the word "resolutions" instead of "ordinances"
and "sheriff" instead of "police department" could be adopted without
the vote of the special majorities. But in the decision under examination
there is the implicit threat that almost any conceivable county charter
would be held to vest municipal power in the government it sought to
create. It is unfortunate that the court saw fit to ignore two pertinent
statutes, to avoid a description, if not a definition, of "municipal power"
that might have served as a guide for the future, and to dispose thus of
a vitally important question under the obscurity of a brief per curiam
opinion.
However, the problem before the court was of considerable diffi-
culty. If municipal powers are those powers vested by legislation and
the Constitution in municipalities and not vested in counties, then the
Legislature can extend by statute the powers which a county can exer-
cise and thus change the meaning of "municipal power." In the same
way, by repealing present statutes, it could restrict the meaning. It
might be argued that, in determining what are and are not municipal
powers, the court should look to the statutes as they existed in 1933
when the amendment to the Constitution was adopted. Under this
view Sec. 2394-4, General Code,.granting the power to a county to
establish a civil service commission, would be ineffective since it was
passed in 1935. With more reason it might be argued that the court
should look to the statutes as they existed at the time of the adoption of
the charter. But under this view what would happen if the Legislature
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repealed a statute vesting certain power in counties? Would the county
be required to forego the exercise of this power even after its inclusion
in the charter?
The difficulty seems to be that the Constitutional Amendment did
not express dearly the intention and purposes of the framers. The re-
quirement as to special majorities was not included merely to make the
adoption of a charter more difficult. It was meant to protect the munic-
ipalities from an invasion of their home rule powers. The amendment
would have expressed this purpose more dearly if, instead of requiring
the special majorities on the vesting of any municipal power in the
county, it had required them only if the municipalities were divested of
any municipal authority. A court favorable to the county charter plan
could have read the Amendment in the light of its evident purpose. The
wording of it was such that another interpretation was possible.
D. M. POSTLEWAITE.
NEGLIGENCE
INTOXICATION - NEGLIGENCE PER SE OR EVIDENCE FOR JURY?
The plaintiff recovered a judgment for $3500 for injuries which
he sustained while riding in Pyler's car, which the latter was driving.
The defendant's bus collided with the car. It was found that the bus
driver was negligent and that his negligence was a proximate cause of
the collision, also that no joint enterprise existed between the plaintiff
and Pyler. The court charged that Pyler's violation of the ordinance
prohibiting driving while intoxicated would not make him negligent
unless it was proved that he was so befuddled by reason of the liquor
that the accident occurred as a proximate result of that intoxication.
The Appellate Court, in upholding this decision, agreed that no
joint enterprise existed and therefore, as the negligence of defendant's
servant was a proximate cause of the collision, the negligence of Pyler
was immaterial. The court went on to say that if Pyler's negligence
had been a point in issue, the fact that he was intoxicated prior to and
at the time of the collision would be merely evidence of the probability
that he was not using due care, and would not constitute negligence
per se to which legal liability would attach in a damage suit. Cleveland
Ry. Co. v. Owens, 51 Ohio App. 53 (Jan. 2o, 1936).
The dictum of the Ohio Court in the principal case follows the
almost unanimous opinion of the courts of this country in holding that
